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The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation
Franz Dietrich and Christian List1
9/2005, revised 4/2009
Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected
propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agen-
das of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities
without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring sys-
tematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation func-
tion (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness
is dictatorial (or e¤ectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions).
Our agenda conditions are tight. Applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggreg-
ation represented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare
function with universal domain is e¤ectively dictatorial.
Keywords: judgment aggregation, logic, impossibility, Mays neutrality
1 Introduction
We prove a new impossibility theorem on the aggregation of individual judg-
ments (acceptance or rejection) on logically connected propositions into corres-
ponding collective judgments. Due to the exible notion of a proposition, the
model of judgment aggregation can represent many realistic decision problems.
For example, the propositions could be the following:
a : "We can a¤ord a budget decit."
a! b: "If we can a¤ord a budget decit, then we should increase spending
on education."
b: "We should increase spending on education."
The interest in judgment aggregation was sparked by the observation that
majority voting on logically connected propositions does not guarantee rational
(i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments: the "discursive paradox"
(Pettit 2001).
a a! b b
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 True False False
Individual 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A discursive paradox
1F. Dietrich, Dept. of Quant. Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD
Maastricht, The Netherlands; C. List, Dept. of Government, London School of Economics,
London WC2A 2AE, U.K. We thank Klaus Nehring and the anonymous referees for very
detailed and helpful comments on this paper.
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In our example, if individual judgments are as shown in Table 1, a majority
accepts a, a majority accepts a ! b, and yet a majority rejects b. Although
judgment aggregation has many similarities to preference aggregation in Con-
dorcets and Arrows tradition, judgment aggregation generalizes preference ag-
gregation2 and faces additional complexities.
In particular, a basic fact about Arrowian preference aggregation is the
following:
If, for a given decision problem (specied by the set of alternatives
to be ranked), majority voting generates irrational collective pref-
erences for some proles of rational individual preferences (which
happens just in case there are at least three alternatives), then so
does any preference aggregation function satisfying Arrows condi-
tions (universal domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant
alternatives, non-dictatorship).
Thus any decision problem susceptible to Condorcets paradox is, more gener-
ally, susceptible to Arrows theorem. No such fact holds for judgment aggrega-
tion. Instead we nd the following:
Even if, for a given decision problem (here specied by the agenda
of propositions under consideration), majority voting generates ir-
rational collective judgments for some proles of rational individual
judgments (which happens just in case the agenda has a minimal
inconsistent subset of three or more propositions), other judgment
aggregation functions may still guarantee collective rationality while
satisfying the counterparts of Arrows conditions.
Thus a decision problem susceptible to a discursive paradox need not be sus-
ceptible to the counterpart of Arrows theorem. Like most example agendas in
the literature, the agenda above is susceptible to a discursive paradox but not
to an Arrow-style impossibility. Neither the size of the agenda nor the sizes of
its minimal inconsistent subsets alone determine whether or not an Arrow-style
impossibility applies. The logical interconnections between the propositions in
the agenda matter in more complex ways. The recent literature on judgment
aggregation has explored this complexity, which also constitutes the motivation
for this paper.
List and Pettit (2002, 2004) formalized judgment aggregation and proved a
rst impossibility theorem, strengthened by Pauly and van Hees (2006), Dietrich
(2007) and Dietrich and List (2007a), which holds for most standard agendas,
but imposes a strong condition of systematicity on the aggregation function.
Systematicity is the conjunction of an Arrow-inspired independence condition
2As illustrated below, preference aggregation can be formally represented as a special case
of judgment aggregation by expressing preference relations as binary ranking propositions in
predicate logic of the form xPy (List and Pettit 2004, Dietrich and List 2007).
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(requiring propositionwise aggregation) and a global neutrality condition (re-
quiring equal treatment of all propositions). Thus the price for the theorems
applicability to many agendas is the strength of its systematicity condition.
Given this problem, several authors have proved impossibility theorems in
which systematicity is weakened to independence (Pauly and van Hees 2006,
Dietrich 2006, Gärdenfors 2006, Nehring and Puppe 2008, van Hees 2007, Di-
etrich and List 2007a, Dokow and Holzman forthcoming, Mongin forthcoming).
But these results exclude many agendas, notably the one in the example above
and many other standard agendas. This is not because the theorems have not
been proved for these agendas, but because they do not hold for them. Indeed,
Dokow and Holzman (forthcoming), extending an earlier result by Nehring and
Puppe (2002) in the related "property space" model, have identied the weak-
est agenda conditions for an Arrow-style impossibility with independence (i.e.,
a result where Arrow-inspired conditions imply dictatorship); and these agenda
conditions are still rather strong, although several oligarchy results are known
for weaker agenda conditions (Nehring and Puppe 2008, Dokow and Holzman
forthcoming).3
Once we give up systematicity, are all serious impossibilities restricted to
special agendas? Unfortunately not. We introduce a condition of unbiased
aggregation, inspired by Mays (1952) neutrality condition and much weaker
by itself than systematicity. Unbiasedness requires an equal treatment of each
proposition and its negation, but not of any two propositions. For most agen-
das, every unbiased judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and
outputs) is dictatorial or at least e¤ectively dictatorial. The lesson is that un-
biasedness, although in isolation considerably weaker than systematicity, turns
out to have very similar implications as systematicity. A mathematically related
earlier result is a theorem by Nehring and Puppe (2005) on strategy-proof social
choice functions that are neutral-within-issues, on which we comment later.
Our result is of interest in light of Mays classic characterization of majority
voting (1952), in so far as it shows that, as soon as Mays binary agenda fp;:pg
3Crucially, for an Arrow-style impossibility result with independence (where the relevant
conditions imply dictatorship), the agenda must be totally blocked, i.e., it must be possible
to link any two propositions by a path of conditional entailments. Under the di¤erent, yet
not fully general condition that the agenda is truth-functional, impossibility results without
assuming systematicity have been proved (Nehring and Puppe 2008, Dokow and Holzman
forthcoming), although these are oligarchy results rather than dictatorship results. These
oligarchy results, in turn, may lead us to expect that a condition such as unbiasedness will
again generate a dictatorship result. For a review, see also List and Puppe (2009). Agendas
describing standard discursive-dilemma situations, say agendas containing premise proposi-
tions and a conclusion proposition (and their negations), are typically not totally blocked, and
only some of them are truth-functional, depending on the relationship between the premises
and the conclusion. They are truth-functional, in particular, in two cases: the case in which
the conclusion proposition is fully determined (in its truth value) by the premise proposi-
tions, and the case in which some premise proposition is a material conditional. (We have left
open whether the conditional a ! b in our leading example is a material one, i.e., logically
equivalent to :a_ b, but arguably it is not, in which case the agenda is not truth-functional.)
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is just slightly enriched by additional propositions, Mays possibility turns into
an impossibility even if Mays monotonicity condition is dropped and anonymity
is signicantly weakened. Our result also applies to (strict) preference aggreg-
ation problems with three or more alternatives: every unbiased social welfare
function with universal domain is e¤ectively dictatorial. Further, our results
can be applied to two related aggregation problems: the belief merging problem
discussed in computer science (e.g., Konieczny and Pino-Perez 2002), and the
aggregation of binary evaluations (e.g., Wilson 1975 and Dokow and Holzman
forthcoming). Throughout this paper we adopt Dietrichs (2007) general logics
framework, which extends the model in List and Pettit (2002, 2004).
2 Denitions
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a group of individuals (n  2) required to make
collective judgments on logically connected propositions.
Language. We consider a language, given by a non-empty set L of sentences
(propositions) closed under negation: p 2 L implies :p 2 L, where : denotes
"not". In addition to negation, the language may contain any other logical op-
erators needed to express the decision problem, such as the classical operators ^
("and"), _ ("or") and! ("if-then"), modal operators, subjunctive conditionals,
etc. As usual in logic, every set S  L is either consistent or inconsistent (not
both). Our results require some regularity axioms on the consistency notion
(valid for many logics, classical or non-classical, propositional or predicate):4
C1 Pairs fp;:pg  L are inconsistent (self-entailment)
C2 Subsets of consistent sets S  L are consistent (monotonicity).
C3 ; is consistent, and each consistent set S  L has a consistent superset T
 L containing a member of each pair p;:p 2 L (completability).
For example, in a propositional logic, L contains propositions such as a, b,
a ! b, a ^ b, where fa; a ! b;:bg is inconsistent, fa;:(a ^ b)g is consistent,
etc. Various realistic decision problems can be represented in our model, in-
cluding preference aggregation problems as illustrated below. Call a set S  L
minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent and every proper subset T ( S is con-
sistent. Call a proposition p 2 L contingent if fpg and f:pg are consistent, a
contradiction if fpg is inconsistent, and a tautology if f:pg is inconsistent.
Agenda. The agenda is a non-empty set X  L of propositions on which
judgments are to be made, where X is a union of pairs fp;:pg (with p not itself
4The conditions C1-C3 can be re-expressed in terms of (equivalent) conditions on the
entailment relation in L (the conditions L1-L3 in Dietrich 2007, who uses the labels "I1-I3"
for "C1-C3"). The reason is that a set S  L is consistent if and only if, for no p 2 L, S
entails p and entails :p.
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a negated proposition). IfX is innite, we require the logic to be compact : every
inconsistent set has a nite inconsistent subset (this holds for many logics). In
the example above, the agenda is X = fa;:a; b;:b; a ! b;:(a ! b)g in a
propositional logic. Notationally, double negations cancel each other out (i.e.,
::p stands for p).5 A subagenda of the agenda X is a subset Y  X that is
itself an agenda, i.e., non-empty and a union of pairs fp;:pg.
Judgment sets. Each individual is judgment set is a subset Ai  X, where
p 2 Ai means that individual i accepts proposition p. A judgment set Ai
is rational if it is (i) consistent and (ii) complete in the sense that, for every
proposition p 2 X, p 2 Ai or :p 2 Ai. Let U be the set of all rational judgment
sets.6 A prole is an n-tuple (A1; : : : ; An) of individual judgment sets.
Aggregation functions. A (judgment) aggregation function is a function F
that assigns to each prole (A1; : : : ; An) in some domain a collective judgment
set F (A1; : : : ; An) = A  X, where p 2 A means that the group accepts
proposition p. An example is majority voting: here F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X :
jfi 2 N : p 2 Aigj > jfi 2 N : p =2 Aigjg for all proles (A1; :::; An) in the
domain. All our results assume that the aggregation function is a function
F : Un ! U, that is:
 F accepts as inputs all possible proles (A1; :::; An) of rational individual
judgment sets ("universal domain"), and
 F generates as outputs rational collective judgment sets ("collective ra-
tionality").
This is a demanding rationality requirement on individuals and on the
collective; but it is a standard requirement.7 Call aggregation function F
unanimity-preserving if F (A; :::; A) = A for every unanimous prole (A; :::; A)
in the domain of F . Call an individual i a dictator (and F dictatorial) if
F (A1; :::; An) = Ai for all proles (A1; :::; An) in the domain of F . For any
subset Y  X, call individual i a dictator on Y (and F dictatorial on Y ) if
F (A1; :::; An) \ Y = Ai \ Y for all proles (A1; :::; An) in the domain of F .
3 Unbiasedness
Our central condition on an aggregation function is inspired by Mays (1952)
condition of neutrality:
5Hereafter, when we write :p and p is already of the form :q, we mean q (rather than
::q).
6Some readers may prefer the notation UX for the set of rational judgment sets on the
agenda X, but since X is assumed to be xed, there is no risk of ambiguity even without the
subscript.
7Relaxations of full rationality within the logic-based model of judgment aggregation are
considered, for example, in List and Pettit (2002), Gärdenfors (2006), Dietrich and List
(2007b), and Dietrich and List (2008).
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Unbiasedness. For any proposition p 2 X and proles (A1; : : : ; An); (A1; : : : ;
An) in the domain of F , if [for all individuals i, p 2 Ai if and only if :p 2 Ai ]
then [p 2 F (A1; : : : ; An) if and only if :p 2 F (A1; : : : ; An)].
Unbiasedness requires an equal treatment of each proposition p 2 X and
its negation :p, regardless of other judgments. If we decompose an aggreg-
ation problem into multiple decisions between proposition-negation pairs, it
can be interpreted as the application of Mays neutrality condition (1952) to
each such pair. Unbiasedness is also related to Nehring and Puppes (2005)
neutrality-within-issues.8 Unbiasedness is considerably weaker than List and
Pettits (2002) condition of systematicity, which requires an aggregation func-
tion to be neutral between any two propositions p; q 2 X:
Systematicity. For any propositions p; q 2 X and proles (A1; : : : ; An);
(A1; : : : ; A

n) in the domain of F , if [for all individuals i, p 2 Ai if and only
if q 2 Ai ] then [p 2 F (A1; : : : ; An) if and only if q 2 F (A1; : : : ; An)].
While systematicity permits all uniform propositionwise decision methods,
such as majority voting, symmetrical supermajority voting, dictatorships or in-
verse dictatorships, unbiasedness also permits aggregation functions that apply
di¤erent decision criteria to di¤erent propositions but the same criterion to each
proposition p 2 X and its negation :p. For example, on some pairs p;:p 2 X
one can apply majority voting, on others weighted majority voting, on yet oth-
ers majority voting within some subgroup or dictatorships or erratic decision
methods like inverse dictatorships, minority voting, or accepting a proposition if
and only if it is supported by an odd number of individuals. Unbiasedness also
di¤ers from a global neutrality condition based on a permutation  : X ! X
of the agenda (e.g., van Hees 2007). It is by itself logically independent from
independence, but implies independence under universal domain and collect-
ive rationality (see Lemma 1 below). Systematicity, by contrast, implies both
independence and global neutrality.
4 A rst impossibility of unbiased aggregation
Our theorems use two weak agenda conditions. Their precise form is justied
by the tighness (necessity) of the conditions in our theorems, as shown below.
First, call agenda X non-separable if it cannot be partitioned into two logic-
ally independent subagendasX1 andX2, each containing at least one contingent
proposition (where X1 and X2 are logically independent if B1 [B2 is consistent
for any consistent subsets B1  X1 and B2  X2). Informally, non-separability
requires that the decision problem cannot be split into two logically independ-
ent decision problems a plausible condition in practice. The agenda in our
8A neutral-within-issues and strategy-proof social choice function induces an unbiased and
monotonic judgment aggregation function.
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example above and many others are non-separable. But if we extend our ex-
ample agenda by adding a new pair c;:c, where c is an atomic proposition, the
new agenda is separable, namely into the old agenda and the binary agenda
fc;:cg.
Second, call agenda X minimally connected if it has these two properties:9
(i) It has a minimal inconsistent subset Y of size at least three (the non-
simplicity condition).
(ii) It has a minimal inconsistent subset Y such that (Y nZ) [ f:p : p 2 Zg
is consistent for some set Z  Y of even size (the even-number negation
condition in Dietrich 2007 and Dietrich and List 2007a; equivalent, for
nite X, to Dokow and Holzmans forthcoming algebraic non-a¢ neness
condition).
All standard example agendas in the judgment aggregation literature are
minimally connected, including our example agenda above (take Y = fa; a !
b;:bg in (i) and (ii) and Z = fa;:bg) and agendas representing preference
aggregation problems with three or more alternatives (as discussed below). The
notorious exception is X = fa;:a; b;:b; a $ b;:(a $ b)g, where $ is taken
to be a material biconditional (i.e., a $ b is logically equivalent to (a ^ b) _
(:a^:b)): (ii) fails since Z does not exist. However, even this agenda becomes
minimally connected once $ is taken to be a subjunctive biconditional, which
is arguably more realistic (Dietrich forthcoming): take Y = fa;:b; a $ bg in
(i) and (ii) and Z = fa; a$ bg. Also the agenda X assumed by List and Pettit
(2002) containing distinct atomic propositions a; b and their conjunction a^ b
is minimally connected: take Y = fa; b;:(a^b)g in (i) and (ii), and Z = fa; bg.
Theorem 1 For (and only for) a non-separable minimally connected agenda,
every unbiased unanimity-preserving aggregation function F : Un ! U is dic-
tatorial.
In Theorem 1, and also in Theorems 2 and 3 below, the necessity of the
agenda conditions (the "only for") assumes a group of size n  3. Theorem 1
immediately implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For any agendaX (without restriction), every unbiased unanimity-
preserving aggregation function F : Un ! U is dictatorial on each non-separable
minimally connected subagenda Y  X.
By Theorem 1, for most agendas, all unbiased aggregation functions (with
rational inputs and outputs) are degenerate: they are dictatorial or overrule
unanimities. Thus non-degenerate aggregation functions must favour some pro-
positions over their negations.
This theorem (and part of its proof) is related to Nehring and Puppes (2005)
results on strategy-proof social choice functions that are neutral-within-issues.
9The sets Y may or may not di¤er between parts (i) and (ii).
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Translated into our framework, their results imply that, under further weakened
agenda conditions (namely dropping property (ii) of minimal connectedness),
every aggregation function F : Un ! U that is unbiased and monotonic (hence
also unanimity-preserving) is dictatorial. So our result uses weaker aggregation
conditions but stronger agenda conditions. (This situation is somewhat similar
to the standard cases in which independence and systematicity are required:
there, too, the additional agenda condition (ii) is needed to obtain a dictatorship
result without monotonicity. For an overview, see List and Puppe 2009.) Similar
remarks apply also to our later theorems, which do not even require a unanimity
condition.
To show the necessity part of Theorem 1 (the "only for"), which holds for
group size n  3, we simply specify counterexamples ("possibilities").
First, suppose agenda X is separable, say into subagendas X1 and X2. Then
an unbiased and unanimity-preserving but not dictatorial aggregation function
F : Un ! U can be dened by
F (A1; :::; An) = F1(A1 \X1; :::; An \X1) [ F2(A1 \X2; :::; An \X2),
where F1 and F2 are dictatorships for the agendas X1 and X2, respectively, with
a di¤erent dictator each time.
Next suppose X violates part (i) of minimal connectedness; so all minimal
inconsistent sets contain at most two propositions. Then majority voting among
any non-singleton odd subset of the individuals, for simplicity the rst three,
given on the universal domain by
F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : a majority of A1; A2; A3 contains pg,
generates consistent (and complete) judgment sets, hence denes an unbiased
unanimity-preserving aggregation function F : Un ! U that is not dictatorial.
Finally, suppose X violates part (ii) of minimal connectedness. Then Dokow
and Holzmans (forthcoming) parity function among the rst three individuals,
dened on the universal domain by
F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : an odd number of A1; A2; A3 contains pg,
generates consistent (and complete) judgment sets (see Dokow and Holzman
forthcoming; for a non-algebraic proof see Dietrich 2007). So F denes an
unbiased unanimity-preserving aggregation function F : Un ! U that is not
dictatorial. Crucially, this function is non-monotonic, and, by Nehring and
Puppes result (2005), there cannot exist a monotonic such function, assuming
that all the other conditions of the theorem are met.
The su¢ ciency proof in Theorem 1 rests on some lemmas. We begin by
establishing the standard property of "independence" or "propositionwise ag-
gregation".
Independence. For any proposition p 2 X and proles (A1; : : : ; An); (A1; : : : ;
An) in the domain of F , if [for all individuals i, p 2 Ai if and only if p 2 Ai ]
then [p 2 F (A1; : : : ; An) if and only if p 2 F (A1; : : : ; An)].
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Lemma 1 Every unbiased aggregation function F : Un ! U is independent.10
Proof. Let F be as specied. Consider any p 2 X and any proles (A1; :::;
An); (A

1; :::; A

n) 2 Un in which the same set of individuals C  N accepts p.
We show that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) if and only if p 2 F (A1; :::; An), as required
by independence. By collective rationality, if p is a tautology, p is contained
in both F (A1; :::; An) and F (A1; :::; A

n); if p is a contradiction, p is contained
in neither of F (A1; :::; An) and F (A1; :::; A

n). Suppose p is contingent. Then
:p is also contingent. There exists a prole (A01; :::; A0n) 2 Un such that ex-
actly the individuals in C accept :p. By unbiasedness, p 2 F (A1; :::; An) is
equivalent to :p 2 F (A01; :::; A0n), which, again by unbiasedness, is equivalent to
p 2 F (A1; :::; An). 
Using Lemma 1, we can easily see why Corollary 1 follows from Theorem
1. Let F : Un ! U be unbiased and unanimity-preserving on some agenda X
(without restriction). Consider a non-separable minimally connected subagenda
Y  X. As F is independent (by Lemma 1), F induces a unique aggregation
function F  for this subagenda: F  has universal domain relative to agenda Y
call this UnY and is for all (A

1; :::; A

n) 2 UnY given by
F (A1; :::; A

n) = F (A1; :::; An) \ Y , (1)
where (A1; :::; An) is a prole in the original domainUn with Ai\Y = Ai for all
i; by independence it does not matter which such prole (A1; :::; An) is chosen.
The function F  inherits from F the properties of unbiasedness, unanimity-
preservation and collective rationality. So, by Theorem 1, F  is dictatorial.
Hence, by (1) and independence, F is dictatorial on Y , as required. 
For the next lemma, call propositions p; q 2 X connected (in X) if they are
conditionally dependent: there exist p 2 fp;:pg and q 2 fq;:qg such that
fp; qg [ Y is inconsistent for some Y  X consistent with p and with q.
And call coalition C  N winning for p 2 X (under F ) if p 2 F (A1; :::; An)
for every prole (A1; :::; An) in the domain with fi : p 2 Aig = C. If an
aggregation function F is independent, it is uniquely determined by the family
(Cp)p2X , where Cp is the set of coalitions winning for p 2 X. Specically, for all
proles (A1; :::; An) in the domain,
F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : fi : p 2 Aig 2 Cpg.
Lemma 2 Suppose F : Un ! U is unbiased. For any p 2 X, let Cp be the set
of coalitions winning for p. Then:
(a) If p 2 X is contingent, Cp = C:p and C 2 Cp , NnC =2 Cp.
(b) If p; q 2 X are connected and F is unanimity-preserving, Cp = Cq.
10Unbiasedness does not imply independence without assuming universal domain and col-
lective rationality.
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Proof. Let F : Un ! U be unbiased. By Lemma 1, F is independent.
(a) Let p 2 X be contingent. To show Cp = C:p, consider any C  N ,
and let us prove that C 2 Cp if and only if C 2 C:p. As p is contingent, there
exist proles (A1; :::; An); (A1; :::; A

n) 2 Un such that C = fi : p 2 Aig = fi :
:p 2 Ai g. By unbiasedness, p 2 F (A1; :::; An) if and only if :p 2 F (A1; :::; An),
whence fi : p 2 Aig 2 Cp if and only if fi : :p 2 Ai g 2 C:p, i.e., C 2 Cp if and
only if C 2 C:p.
To prove the second part of (a), let C  N again. As p is contingent,
there exists a prole (A1; :::; An) 2 Un such that C = fi : p 2 Aig, hence
NnC = fi : :p 2 Aig. Now C 2 Cp is equivalent to p 2 F (A1; :::; An), hence to
:p =2 F (A1; :::; An), hence to NnC =2 C:p, hence to NnC =2 Cp, as shown above.
(b) Suppose p; q 2 X are connected and F is unanimity-preserving. Then
there exist v 2 fp;:pg and w 2 fq;:qg and Y  X such that (i) each of
fvg[Y and fwg[Y is consistent, and (ii) fv; wg[Y is inconsistent. It follows
that (iii) each of fv;:wg [ Y and f:v; wg [ Y is consistent. By (iii), v and w
are contingent. So, by part (a), it is su¢ cient to show that Cv = Cw. We only
show that Cv  Cw, as the converse inclusion is analogous. Suppose C 2 Cv.
By (iii) and universal domain there exists a prole (A1; :::; An) 2 Un such that
fv;:wg[Y  Ai for all i 2 C and f:v; wg[Y  Ai for all i 2 NnC. We have
v 2 F (A1; :::; An) as Cv contains C, and Y  F (A1; :::; An) as each Cy, y 2 Y ,
contains N by unanimity-preservation. Because of fvg [ Y  F (A1; :::; An)
and (ii), w =2 F (A1; :::; An). So NnC =2 Cw, and hence C 2 Cw by part (a), as
required. 
We now show that non-separability of the agenda X is equivalent to another
structural property. Call propositions p; q 2 X indirectly connected if there exist
p1; :::; pk 2 X with p1 = p and pk = q such that any two neighbours pt; pt+1 are
connected (as dened above). And call agenda X indirectly connected if any
two contingent propositions p; q 2 X are indirectly connected.
Lemma 3 An agenda is non-separable if and only if it is indirectly connected.
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that all p 2 X are con-
tingent, because if X also has non-contingent members then X is indirectly
connected if and only if the subagenda fp 2 X : p is contingentg is indirectly
connected, and X is non-separable if and only if fp 2 X : p is contingentg is
non-separable (if X has only non-contingent members, the claim is trivial).
First, assume X is separable. Then there is a partition of X into logically
independent subagendas X1; X2. Consider any p 2 X1 and q 2 X2. We show
that p and q are not indirectly connected. Suppose for a contradiction that
p1; :::; pm 2 X (m  1) are such that p = p1, q = pm, and pt and pt+1 are
connected for any t 2 f1; :::;m   1g. As p1 2 X1 and pm 2 X2, there must
be a t 2 f1; :::;m   1g such that pt 2 X1 and pt+1 2 X2. As pt and pt+1
are connected, there are pt 2 fpt;:ptg, pt+1 2 fpt+1;:pt+1g and Y  X such
that (i) fpt ; pt+1g [ Y is inconsistent and (ii) each of fptg [ Y and fpt+1g [ Y
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is consistent. By (ii), each of the sets B1 := (fptg [ Y ) \ X1 and B1 :=
(fpt+1g [ Y ) \ X2 is consistent. So B1 [ B2 is consistent, as X1 and X2 are
logically independent. But
B1 [B2 = [(fptg [ Y ) \X1] [ [(fpt+1g [ Y ) \X2]
= [(fpt ; pt+1g [ Y ) \X1] [ [(fpt ; pt+1g [ Y ) \X2]
= (fpt ; pt+1g [ Y ) \ [X1 [X2] = fpt ; pt+1g [ Y;
which is inconsistent by (ii), a contradiction.
Secondly, let X be not indirectly connected. We show that X is separable.
By assumption, there exist p; q 2 X that are not indirectly connected. Dene
X1 := fr 2 X : p and r are indirectly connectedg and X2 := XnX1. Since p is
indirectly connected to itself (as p is contingent), p 2 X1. Further, q 2 X2. So
each of X1 and X2 is non-empty. Moreover, each of X1 and X2 is closed under
negation (like X). If follows that X1 and X2 are subagendas of X.
We complete the proof by showing thatX1 andX2 are logically independent.
Suppose for a contradiction that B1  X1 and B2  X2 are each consistent but
that B1 [ B2 is inconsistent. As X is nite or the logic compact, there exists
a minimal inconsistent subset B  B1 [ B2. We have neither B  B1 nor
B  B2, since otherwise B would be consistent. So there exist r 2 B \X1 and
s 2 B\X2. Propositions r and s are connected, because, putting Y := Bnfr; sg,
fr; sg[Y = B is inconsistent, but each of frg[Y = Bnfsg and fsg[Y = Bnfrg
is consistent by Bs minimal inconsistency. This is a contradiction. 
Essentially by combining Lemma 3 with part (b) of Lemma 2, we now deduce
systematicity (which brings us into the terrain of known results of the literature).
Lemma 4 For a non-separable agenda X, every unbiased unanimity-preserving
aggregation function F : Un ! U is systematic.
Proof. Let X and F be as specied. Consider propositions p; q 2 X and
proles (A1; : : : ; An); (A1; : : : ; A

n) 2 Un, such that (*) for all individuals i,
p 2 Ai , q 2 Ai . We show that (**) p 2 F (A1; :::; An), q 2 F (A1; :::; An). If
p and q are both contingent, then they are indirectly connected by Lemma 3,
hence have the same set of winning coalitions by iterated applications of part (b)
of Lemma 2; so, using (*), we obtain (**). If p or q is a tautology then, by indi-
vidual rationality and (*), all Ai contain p and all Ai contain q; so by unanimity-
preservation (and independence) p 2 F (A1; :::; An) and q 2 F (A1; :::; An), im-
plying (**). Finally, if p or q is a contradiction then, by individual rationality
and (*), all Ai contain :p and all Ai contain :q; so by unanimity-preservation
(and independence) :p 2 F (A1; :::; An) and :q 2 F (A1; :::; An), which again
implies (**) (by collective rationality). 
Lemma 4 together with the following known result implies the su¢ ciency
part of Theorem 1, hence completes the proof.
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Lemma 5 (Dietrich and List 2007a) For a minimally connected agenda, every
systematic unanimity-preserving aggregation function F : Un ! U is dictat-
orial.
To make the present argument self-contained, we sketch the proof of this
result. Let the agenda X and the function F be as specied. By systematicity,
there is a set C of ("winning") coalitions C  N such that
F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : fi : p 2 Aig 2 Cg for all (A1; :::; An) 2 Un.
Steps (a)-(e) below show the existence of a dictator i, i.e., C = fC  N : i 2 Cg.
(a) N 2 C, by unanimity-preservation.
(b) C 2 C , NnC =2 C, as exactly one member of any p;:p 2 X is accepted.
(c) [C 2 C & C  C  N ] ) C 2 C. Suppose C 2 C & C  C  N .
Let Y  X be as in part (ii) of "minimal connectedness". For illustrative
purposes, let Y be binary, say Y = fp; qg (see Dietrich and List 2007a for
the general case). Then fp; qg is inconsistent, but fp;:qg; f:p; qg; f:p;:qg are
each consistent. Consider a prole (A1; :::; An) 2 Un such that fp;:qg  Ai
if i 2 C, f:p;:qg  Ai if i 2 CnC, and f:p; qg  Ai otherwise. As C 2 C,
p 2 F (A1; :::; An). So, by fp; qgs inconsistency, :q 2 F (A1; :::; An). Hence
C 2 C.
(d) C;C 2 C ) C \ C 2 C. Let C;C 2 C. Let Y  X be as in part (i)
of "minimal connectedness". Consider distinct p; q; r 2 Y . Consider a prole
in which each individual accepts all s 2 Y nfp; q; rg, and rejects exactly one of
p; q; r: all i 2 C \C reject p, all i 2 CnC reject q, and all others reject r. By
(a), all s 2 Y nfp; q; rg are collectively accepted. As exactly all i 2 C (2 C)
accept r, the collective accepts r. As at least all i 2 C (2 C) accept q, the
collective accepts q by (c). So, as Y is inconsistent, the collective accepts :p.
Hence C \ C 2 C.
(e) C = fC  N : i 2 Cg for some individual (dictator) i. By (d), ~C :=
\C2CC 2 C. So ~C 6= ; (as ; =2 C by (a) and (b)). ~C must be singleton, say
~C = fig: otherwise ~C could be partitioned into two non-empty coalitions C;C 0,
where NnC;NnC 0 2 C by (b), hence Nn ~C=(NnC) \ (NnC 0) 2 C by (d), and
so ~C =2 C by (b), a contradiction. By fig 2 C and (c), fC  N : i 2 Cg  C.
This inclusion also implies the converse inclusion by (b). 
5 Two impossibilities without the unanimity
condition
To strengthen the impossibility of unbiased aggregation further, we now show
that even without requiring unanimity-preservation we still run into impossib-
ility. We prove two theorems, both of which merely assume the aggregation
function F : Un ! U to be unbiased. In the rst result, we strengthen The-
orem 1s agenda condition in such a way that unanimity-preservation can be
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derived ; so Theorem 1 applies and implies dictatorship. In the second result, we
keep Theorem 1s mild agenda condition, and show that an equally undesirable
variant of dictatorship follows: an "e¤ective dictatorship".
Given that we now only require the aggregation function F : Un ! U to
be unbiased, it may seem that at least some such F can overrule at least some
unanimous judgments. Surprisingly, for many agendas this is not the case. First
assume the agenda X is asymmetric: there exists a consistent set A  X such
that f:p : p 2 Ag is inconsistent (Dietrich 2007, Dietrich and List 2007a).
Then F cannot overrule unanimous judgments for every p 2 A: otherwise, if
all individuals accept all p 2 A, the collective accepts all :p (with p 2 A),
a collective inconsistency. But F may still overrule unanimous judgments on
some p 2 XnA. To prevent any overruling of unanimity, the agenda must be
locally asymmetric: for every subagenda Y  X, there exists a consistent set
A  X that becomes inconsistent by negating those propositions that are in Y
(i.e., (AnY )[f:p : p 2 A\Y g is inconsistent). (Local asymmetry is a stronger
condition than asymmetry: by taking Y = X, the former implies the latter.)
Examples are discussed shortly.
Lemma 6 For (and only) for a locally asymmetric agenda, every unbiased ag-
gregation function F : Un ! U is unanimity-preserving.
Proof. First suppose F : Un ! U is unbiased and not unanimity-preserving.
Then Z := fp 2 X :N is not a winning coalition for pg is non-empty. Z is closed
under negation: if p 2 Z then p is contingent, and hence :p 2 Z by part (a)
of Lemma 2. So Z is a subagenda. To show that X is not locally asymmetric,
we show that, for every consistent set A  X, also (AnZ) [ f:p : p 2 A \ Zg
is consistent. It obviously su¢ ces to show this for the case that A is complete.
So let A  X be complete and consistent, i.e., A 2 U. By denition of Z,
F (A; :::; A) contains all p 2 AnZ and all :p with p 2 A \ Z, the latter because
by part (a) of Lemma 2 the empty coalition is winning for :p. So F (A; :::; A)
contains all members of the set (AnZ) [ f:p : p 2 A \ Zg. Hence this set is
consistent, as required.
Conversely, suppose X is not locally asymmetric. Then there is a subagenda
Z  X such that (*) for all consistent sets A  X, also (AnZ)[f:p : p 2 A\Zg
consistent. Let i be an individual and F the aggregation function with universal
domain Un that makes i a dictator on XnZ and an inverse dictator on Z; that
is, for all (A1; :::; An) 2 Un,
F (A1; :::; An) = (AinZ) [ f:p : p 2 Ai \ Zg.
By construction, F is unbiased, because i is a dictator on p if and only if i
is a dictator on :p, and generates complete judgment sets. It also generates
consistent ones by (*); hence F : Un ! U. But, as required, F is not unanimity-
preserving, because for all (A; :::; A) 2 Un we have F (A; :::; A) = (AnZ)[f:p :
p 2 A \ Zg 6= A. 
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This lemma together with Theorem 1 implies our next theorem.
Theorem 2 For (and only for) a non-separable, minimally connected and loc-
ally asymmetric agenda, every unbiased aggregation function F : Un ! U is
dictatorial.
As in the case of Theorem 1, a corollary follows (using Lemma 1):
Corollary 2 For any agenda X (without restriction), every unbiased aggreg-
ation function F : Un ! U is dictatorial on each non-separable, minimally
connected and locally asymmetric subagenda Y  X.
Theorem 2 applies to our example agenda X = fa;:a; b;:b; a ! b;:(a !
b)g, which is locally asymmetric, as we now check by going through the sub-
agendas Y  X. For Y = fa;:ag, let A = f:a; a ! b;:bg (as A is con-
sistent but fa; a ! b;:bg is not). For Y = fb;:bg, let A = fa; a ! b; bg.
In general, for any subagenda Y , let A  X be the unique set for which
(AnY ) [ f:p : p 2 A \ Y g = fa; a ! b;:bg, i.e., let A be the set arising
from fa; a ! b;:bg by negating all p 2 A \ Y . The so-constructed set A is
indeed consistent since fa; a ! b;:bg becomes consistent after negating one,
two or all of its member(s), assuming here that "!" is a subjunctive implication
(see Dietrich forthcoming). If, less realistically, "!" is a material implication
(i.e., a! b is equivalent to :a_ b), then this way to construct A does not work
for all subagendas Y ,11 but other constructions work.
But Theorem 2 does not apply to the strict preference aggregation prob-
lem discussed below: this agenda is not locally asymmetric, in fact not even
asymmetric simpliciter because inverting (negating) rational strict preferences
yields rational strict preferences. This illustrates that the strong impossibility
of Theorem 2 ("unbiasedness implies dictatorship") applies to fewer agendas
than the impossibilities of Theorem 1 above and Theorem 3 below.
Now we turn to our last impossibility result, which requires neither the
unanimity condition of Theorem 1 nor the extra agenda condition of Theorem
2.
For any subset Y  X, call individual i an inverse dictator on Y if
F (A1; :::; An) \ Y = Y nAi for all proles (A1; :::; An) in the domain. Call indi-
vidual i an e¤ective dictator (and F e¤ectively dictatorial) if there is a parti-
tion of X into subsets X+; X  (each one possibly empty) such that individual
i is a dictator on X+ and an inverse dictator on X ; that is, F (A1; :::; An) =
(X+ \Ai) [ (X nAi) for all proles (A1; :::; An) in the domain. For any subset
Y  X, call individual i an e¤ective dictator on Y (and F e¤ectively dictatorial
on Y ) if there is a partition of Y into subsets Y+; Y  (each one possibly empty)
11Because fa; a ! b;:bg stays inconsistent after negating a ! b as well as one or both of
a and :b (e.g., fa;:(a! b); bg is inconsistent as the negated material implication :(a! b)
is equivalent to a ^ :b). Under the subjunctive interpretation of "!", by contrast, the set
fa; a! b;:bg becomes consistent as soon as at least one of its members is negated.
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such that individual i is a dictator on Y+ and an inverse dictator on Y ; that
is, F (A1; :::; An) \ Y = (Y+ \ Ai) [ (Y nAi) for all proles (A1; :::; An) in the
domain.
Theorem 3 For (and only for) a non-separable minimally connected agenda,
every unbiased aggregation function F : Un ! U is e¤ectively dictatorial.
Again, a corollary follows (using Lemma 1):
Corollary 3 For any agenda X (without restriction), every unbiased aggreg-
ation function F : Un ! U is e¤ectively dictatorial on each non-separable
minimally connected subagenda Y  X.
Note a further corollary. Call aggregation function F anonymous if, for any
proles (A1; : : : ; An) and (A(1); :::; A(n)) in the domain, where  : N ! N is a
permutation, F (A1; : : : ; An) = F (A(1); : : : ; A(n)).
Corollary 4 If the agenda has a non-separable and minimally connected sub-
agenda (possibly the entire agenda itself), there exists no anonymous unbiased
aggregation function F : Un ! U.
Corollary 4 signicantly strengthens List and Pettits (2002) theorem by
individually weakening the conditions generating the impossibility: namely by
weakening systematicity to unbiasedness and weakening the agenda condition.
Without weakening systematicity to unbiasedness, the agenda condition in List
and Pettits result can be weakened further than in Corollary 4, namely to
minimal connectedness alone (Dietrich and List 2007a).
Theorem 3 and Corollary 4 are particularly interesting in light of Mays
classic characterization of majority voting (1952). Translated into our termin-
ology, Mays theorem (without indi¤erence) states that, for any binary agenda
X = fp;:pg, an aggregation function F : Un ! U is majority voting if and
only if it is anonymous, unbiased and monotonic.12 Our result shows that, if
the agenda is just slightly enriched beyond binariness, Mays theorem collapses
into an impossibility result even if monotonicity is dropped and anonymity is
weakened to the requirement that there be no e¤ective dictator.
In Theorem 3, the necessity of the agenda conditions (the "only for") fol-
lows from the aggregation functions constructed earlier to show necessity in
Theorem 1. These aggregation functions are not only non-dictatorial but also
not e¤ectively dictatorial.
Regarding su¢ ciency, we rst show that the aggregation function F in The-
orem 3 induces a unanimity-preserving aggregation function bF :
12Where n is odd. An aggregation function F is monotonic if, for all individuals i and
all proles (A1; :::; An); (A1; :::; Ai ; :::; An) in the domain di¤ering only in is judgment set, if
F (A1; :::; An) = A

i then F (A1; :::; A

i ; :::; An) = A

i .
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Lemma 7 Suppose F : Un ! U is unbiased. Dene, for each p 2 X,
bp :=  p if N is a winning coalition for p;:p if N is not a winning coalition for p.
Then:
(a) For any p 2 X, c:p = :bp and bbp = p.
(b) For any A  X, A is consistent if and only if fbp : p 2 Ag is consistent.
(c) The aggregation function bF with universal domain Un dened by
bF (A1; :::; An) = fbp : p 2 F (A1; :::; An)g
satises unbiasedness, unanimity-preservation and collective rationality.
(d) For every p 2 X,
Cp =
( bCp if bp = p
fC  N : C =2 bCpg if bp = :p,
where Cp (bCp) is the set of coalitions winning for p under F ( bF ).
Proof. Let F be as specied.
(a) Suppose p 2 X. N is winning for p if and only if N is winning for :p; if
p is contingent this follows easily from unbiasedness (see also part (a) of Lemma
2); if p is not contingent it holds because N is winning for every tautology and
(vacuously) for every contradiction. As N is winning for p if and only if N
is winning for :p, we have bp = p if and only if c:p = :p, whence c:p = :bp.
Moreover, if bp = p then bbp = bp = p, and if bp = :p then bbp = c:p = :bp = ::p = p.
(b) LetA  X. By (a) it is su¢ cient to show one direction of the implication.
Let A be consistent. Then there exists a set B 2 U such that A  B. For each
p 2 A, F (B; :::; B) contains bp because:
- if N 2 Cp then bp = p 2 F (B; :::; B);
- if N =2 Cp then p =2 F (B; :::; B), and so bp = :p 2 F (B; :::; B).
By fbp : p 2 Ag  F (B; :::; B); fbp : p 2 Ag is consistent.
(c) For any (A1; :::; An) 2 Un, bF (A1; :::; An) is
- consistent by (b) and the consistency of F (A1; :::; An);
- complete as, for any p 2 X, if p =2 bF (A1; :::; An) then bp =2 F (A1; :::; An) by
p = bbp, hence :bp 2 F (A1; :::; An), and so bF (A1; :::; An) contains c:bp = c:p = :p.bF is unanimity-preserving: for any p 2 X and any (A1; :::; An) 2 Un with
p 2 Ai for all individuals i,
- if p 2 F (A1; :::; An), then N is a winning coalition for p under F by
independence (see Lemma 1), hence bp = p, and so p 2 bF (A1; :::; An);
- if p =2 F (A1; :::; An), then :p 2 F (A1; :::; An), hence c:p 2 bF (A1; :::; An),
where c:p = :bp = ::p = p (since bp = :p).
To show that bF is unbiased, consider any p 2 X and (A1; :::; An); (A1; :::; An)
2 Un such that p 2 Ai if and only if :p 2 Ai . Then (*) bp 2 Ai if and only if
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:bp 2 Ai . Now p 2 bF (A1; :::; An) is equivalent to bp 2 F (A1; :::; An), by denition
of bF and as p = bbp. The latter is equivalent to :bp 2 F (A1; :::; An), by (*) and as
F is unbiased. This, in turn, is equivalent to c:bp 2 bF (A1; :::; An) by denition
of bF , i.e., to :p 2 bF (A1; :::; An) as c:bp = c:p = :p by part (a).
(d) Let p, Cp and bCp be as specied.
First let bp = p. Then Cp = bCp, because, for any prole (A1; :::; An) 2 Un,
p 2 F (A1; :::; An) is equivalent to bp 2 bF (A1; :::; An) (using that bbp = p), i.e., to
p 2 bF (A1; :::; An).
Now let bp = :p. To show that Cp = fC  N : C =2 bCpg, we consider any
C  N , and prove that C 2 Cp is equivalent to C =2 bCp. By bp = :p, p is
contingent, and so there exists a prole (A1; :::; An) 2 Un such that fi : p 2
Aig = C. Now C 2 Cp is equivalent to p 2 F (A1; :::; An), which is equivalent
to bp 2 bF (A1; :::; An) (as in case 1), i.e., to :p 2 bF (A1; :::; An), hence to p =2bF (A1; :::; An), and so to C =2 bCp, as required. 
To prove (the su¢ ciency part of) Theorem 3, let X be non-separable and
minimally connected, and let F : Un ! U be unbiased. Let bF and bp (for
any p 2 X) be dened as in Lemma 7. By part (c) of Lemma 7, bF satises
all conditions required in Theorem 1. So bF is dictatorial by Theorem 1, say
with dictator i. Hence, by part (d) of Lemma 7, i is under F a dictator on
Z+ := fp 2 X : bp = pg and an inverse dictator on Z  := fp 2 X : bp = :pg
(= XnZ+). So F is e¤ectively dictatorial. 
6 An illustration
To illustrate the generality of our result, we apply Theorem 1 to the aggregation
of (strict) preferences, represented in the judgment aggregation model. We
consider the agenda X = fxPy;:xPy 2 L : x; y 2 K with x 6= yg, where
 L is a predicate logic for representing preferences, with
 a two-place predicate P (representing strict preference), and
 a set of constants K = fx; y; z; :::g with jKj  3 (representing al-
ternatives).
 A is consistent if and only if A [ Z is consistent in the standard sense
of predicate logic, with Z dened as the set of rationality conditions on
strict preferences.13
For details of this construction, see Dietrich and List (2007a) (also List and
Pettit 2004). Each rational judgment set Ai  X uniquely represents a strict
(i.e., asymmetric, transitive and connected) preference relation i K  K,
13Formally, Z contains (8v1)(8v2)(v1Pv2 ! :v2Pv1) (asymmetry),
(8v1)(8v2)(8v3)((v1Pv2 ^ v2Pv3) ! v1Pv3) (transitivity), (8v1)(8v2)(: v1 = v2 !
(v1Pv2 _ v2Pv1)) (connectedness) and, for any distinct constants x; y 2 K, :x = y
(exclusiveness of alternatives).
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where, for any x; y 2 K, xPy 2 Ai if and only if x i y. For example,
if K = fx; y; zg, the preference relation x i y i z is represented by the
judgment set Ai = fxPy; yPz; xPz;:yPx;:zPy;:zPxg.
The agenda X thus dened is non-separable. It is also minimally connected
(take Y = fxPy; yPz; zPxg in parts (i) and (ii) and Z = fxPy; yPzg, where
x; y; z 2 K are distinct alternatives). So Theorems 1 and 3 apply (whereas
Theorem 2 does not apply, as X is not locally asymmetric, in fact not even
asymmetric). Let us state Theorem 3 for this agenda:
Corollary 5 For the agenda X = fxPy;:xPy 2 L : x; y 2 K with x 6= yg,
every unbiased aggregation function F : Un ! U is e¤ectively dictatorial.
What does this mean in the language of preference aggregation? A judg-
ment aggregation function F : Un ! U uniquely represents a social welfare
function with universal domain (taking strict preferences as input and output).
Unbiasedness, applied to such a social welfare function, becomes the condi-
tion that, for any pair of alternatives x; y 2 K and any two preference proles
(1; :::;n), (1; :::;n) in the universal domain, if [for all individuals i, x i y
if and only if y i x] then [x  y if and only if y  x]. Corollary 5 thus
implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is
e¤ectively dictatorial. No unanimity (Pareto) condition is needed. Although
this result could also be obtained in standard social choice theory (for example,
via Wilsons 1972 result on social choice without the Pareto principle), the
observation that it is a corollary of our new result on judgment aggregation
should illustrate the results generality. Interestingly, unlike Wilsons and Ar-
rows theorems, our result continues to hold even if the rationality conditions
on preference relations are relaxed to acyclicity alone (giving up full transitiv-
ity and connectedness). The reason is that the agenda X, as specied above,
remains non-separable and minimally connected in a modied predicate logic
obtained by weakening the conditions in the set Z above so as to capture acyc-
licity alone.14
7 Concluding remarks
In judgment aggregation, we face not only a trade-o¤ between di¤erent con-
ditions on an aggregation function for any given agenda, as in preference ag-
gregation, but also a trade-o¤ between these conditions and the generality of
the agendas for which they can be met by an aggregation function. We have
proved three impossibility results. Two of them (Theorems 1 and 3) apply to all
standard example agendas in the literature, including the agendas representing
preference agggregation problems. This generality is surprising, as we do not
14Formally, Z then contains, for any sequence of distinct constants x1; x2; :::; xk 2 K; the
proposition (x1Px2 ^ ::: ^ xk 1Pxk) ! :xkPx1 (no cycle over x1; x2; :::; xk) and, for any
distinct constants x; y 2 K, :x = y (exclusiveness of alternatives).
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impose the requirement of systematicity, a condition often criticized as being
too strong. We impose the weaker condition of unbiasedness: a May-type neut-
rality condition applied to each proposition-negation pair, without requiring
neutrality across pairs.
Our results show that, for many agendas, unbiasedness leads to dictatorship,
or at least to e¤ective dictatorship. Thus the implications of unbiasedness are
surprisingly similar to those of systematicity, despite the fact that unbiased is
by itself considerably weaker than systematicity. Our agenda conditions (non-
separability, minimal connectedness, and in Theorem 2 also local asymmetry)
are tight: agendas that violate any of them avoid the impossibility. Theorems 2
and 3 require no unanimity, monotonicity or other responsiveness condition,15
unlike many related impossibility results of social choice. But we retain full
rationality of individuals and the group. (If we give up full rationality, un-
biasedness does become satisable together with our other conditions, e.g., by
symmetrical special majority voting, as discussed in List and Pettit 2002 and
Dietrich and List 2007b, and by other oligarchic rules, e.g., Gärdenfors 2006,
Dietrich and List 2008.)
Our results appear signicant, as they imply that, in virtually all realistic
judgment aggregation problems, any aggregation function with commonly ac-
cepted properties must favour some propositions over their negations.
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